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The paper analyzes the changes in the relative labor market
position of the public sector employees, using both macro-level
employment statistics and large wage surveys. While competitive
employment decreased by more than 30 per cent during the
transition, number of public employees have not change a lot, so a
very large public employment ratio was reached in 1995. Due to
obvious budget reasons, these trends led to dramatic decreases in
relative public sector salaries, within comparable groups. For some
occupation groups, unmeasured but not illegal differences can
compensate for earnings losses, but the ratio of these employees
does not seem to be significant. The widening of private-public
salary gap could have than two major effects: increasing ratio of
less qualified employees in public institutions and/or major role of
illegal benefits in workers’ compensation. As none of these results
are favorable from social perspective, public sector reform should
consider significant changes in public employment incentives.
The study analyses observable trends of employment and salaries in the
public sector in Hungary. Instead of investigating the situation of
employees in institutions having ‘public’ functions (providing public
goods, regulating social activity, etc.) or financed from public sources, we
focus our analysis on some definite branches: public administration, health
and education. It is worth noting that a part of public employment are
involved in other areas, such as research or cultural activities. Functional
distinction cannot be made between private and public institutions in these
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branches, so data concerning them are not reliable enough. In the 1990s,
the uncovered branches contain around 10 percent of total public
employment. Another problem arises about employees in justice,
prosecution, police and armed forces, because published Hungarian
statistics and wage surveys do not provide appropriate data concerning
these branches. Employees in justice and prosecution are included in
‘public administration’ in the following analysis. Employees in police and
armed forces are also included in ‘public administration’ in aggregate
statistics (consisting at least a half of employment in it), but the absolute
lack of data prevents us from investigating their salary position.
In the following analysis, the adjective ‘private’ or ‘competitive’ indicates
the non-public sector of the economy. It is clear, however, that at the
beginning of the transition private firms did not play a major role in the
economy. Also the magnitude of monopoly structures questions the
appropriate use of word ‘competitive’. In the socialist system, the labour
demand of the whole economy was much more similar to that of the current
public sector than to patterns of capitalist input demand. From labour
market point of view, transition itself means the evolution of labor demand
patterns of profit-oriented firms. For the sake of simplicity, however we
will denote ‘private’ or ‘competitive’ sector the rest of the economy
(without public administration, helath and education), in the socialist
system as well.
The study consists of two major parts. The first part reveals the trends in
public employment in Hungary, and tries to provide some comparisons
with other Central European transition economies. The second part consists
of a description and an analysis of salary changes in the public sector. At
the end we try to draw some important conclusions concerning incentive
issues.
Employment in public sector in Hungary
The following data provide information on public sector employment in
Hungary: changes in the absolute numbers and ratios, and some
international comparisons. The published statistics are sometimes
inconsistent. This way a careful approach is needed. We have found EC
[1992] and EC [1995] the most reliable and appropriate sources for our
purposes. The major problems are the followings. First, police, armed
forces, prosecution and justice employment is included into ‘public3
administration’. Second, pre-transitional public employment data should
not be compared directly to 1990-95 statistics, because of definition and
coverage differences.
Table 1. Public sector employment in Hungary,
1985-1995, selected years
1985 1989 1992 1995
Public administration 227 258 311 316
Health & education 573 637 548 568
   Public sector 800 895 859 884
   Private sector 4 103 3 914 3 237 2 780
SUM 4 903 4 809 4 096 3 664
Public sector (public administration, health and education) employment
rose by ten per cent from 1985 to 1995, while private sector employment
fell by 32 per cent in the same period. The consequences of these trends to
the ratio of public employment are summed up in the next table.
Table 2. Public sector employment in Hungary, as










1986 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a.




1990 5.9 13.0 19.0
1991 6.2 13.7 19.9
1992 7.6 13.4 21.0
1993 7.8 15.3 23.1
1994 8.6 15.4 24.0
1995 8.6 15.5 24.1
a Employment data for 1985 and 1989 are not directly
comparable with those from 1990.
Stagnant public and declining private employment led to a significant
increase in public employment ratio, from 19 per cent in 1990 to 24 per4
cent in 1995. The increase between 1985 and 1989 is of the same
magnitude (from 16 to 22 per cent), but can be attributed to an increase in
public, and a decrease in private employment. The end of the 1980s
experienced the start of the transition in private labour demand (see Köllõ,
[1997]) and in the same time, an increase in the role of public sectors. As
we will see, the same strengthening public position can be observed in
relative salaries in the last years of socialist system.
Next table provides international comparison for the rates of employment
in public sectors focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. Fortunately,
comparable data are available for most of the relevant countries (i.e. for
those in more or less similar to Hungary, concerning the state of transition).
Unfortunately, comparison can be made only for the middle-1990s, this
way the roots of differences can not be evaluated directly. Two type of
indicators are considered: the ratio of public employment to the total
population of the country can be viewed as a rough approximation to the
output of the branch (how many people are seved by civil servants); while
the ratio to the total employment cen be viewed as a rough approximation
to the input of the branch (how many private employees finance the civil
servants’ work).
Table 3. Public sector employment in Central and Eastern Europe, 1995








Hungary 3.1 5.5 8.6 24.1
Slovakia 2.5 5.9 8.4 21.1
Czech R. 2.6 5.7 8.3 17.6
Poland 1.8 5.0 6.8 17.6
Romania 2.5 3.4 5.9 12.1
Employment data: 2nd quarter of 1995. Population data: 1994.
Source: EC, [1995]
Among Central and Eastern European countries, Hungary has the largest
public sector, from both output and input viewpoints. The size of
Hungarian public administration is by far the largest, and that of health and
education is also among the largests. However, the picture from the
“output” viewpoint is more homogenous, as Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia have very close ratios. Concerning input (financial) issues,
Hungary seems to face a much more serious problem than the others.5
(Differences in the two types of indicators can be attributed to differences
in total employment deterioration, so industry restructuring can move the
states of the former Czechoslovakia closer to the Hungarian trouble.)
Ratio of public sector to total employment is close to one fourth in
Hungary, (only Slovakia follows it with more than 20 per cent), while
relative public employment is more than one-fourth less in the Czech
Republic and Poland. While appropriate data are not available for the
preceding years, incomplete and distorted information show that at the end
of the 1980s, relative positions could not be significantly different to those
observed in 1995 (EC [1992]).
The cross-country figures and the end of our time series represent the 1995
second quarter positions, the last ‘minutes’ before the introduction of
Hungarian public sector reform measures. However, these measures did not
result in significant changes in the number of employees during 1995, and
only health and education experienced a major (ten per cent) employment
loss in 1996 (see World Bank, [1997]).
Public sector earnings in Hungary
In the second part, we investigate the trends of salaries in public sector.
Like in the first part, we restrict our analysis to public administration,
health and education. We treat public (that is, primary and secondary)
education and higher education as distinct branches because of the
differences in their observed trends. While the most important changes are
common, large differences can be found at several points in the story of
these four branches.
Data of large cross-sectional surveys on employees’ wage, other salary
components, gender, age, education level and occupation are used in our
analysis. Six databases (‘wage tariff surveys’) are available, between 1986
and 1996. The data were collected by National Labour Center (Országos
Munkaügyi Központ) and contain 150–600 thousand individual
observations from middle and large firms and institutions (employing ten
or more people). Detailed description of these databases, correction
procedures for sampling distortions, and statistics for the whole samples are
published by Kertesi and Köllõ [1995].
During our investigations, we concentrate on total salaries rather than
monthly wages to explore the trends in total work compensation. Of course,6
non-monetary compensations can play a very important role in
compensation, and their magnitude can show large differences in public
and private sectors. Only speculative arguments can be used for estimating
their effects, because no data can be found on them. We will return to this
question at the interpretation of observed trends, but in the following
section measurable trends are to be analyzed.
We concentrate on the story of the whole transition, so detailed analysis is
evaluated for 1986–1996 differences. Of course, this strategy leads to large
simplifications, since the transition process produces many short-term
changes. At the same time, results of the whole period are better captured
by comparisons of two, more or less stable points at the two ends of the
period. In addition, statistical institutions were not exceptions from the
institutional changes so their services are more reliable for the more stable
states of the economy.
However, it is useful to follow the year-to-year general changes. Let us
glance at the average earnings trends of the public sectors.
Table 4. Real salary
a dynamics, 1986=100
1986 1989 1992 1994 1995 1996
Public administration 100 124 117 123 113 94
Public education 100 112 104 112 93 85
Higher education 100 128 107 119 102 93
Health services 100 113 102 111 91 86
Private sector 100 109 104 113 100 98
Employees, total 100 110 104 114 99 96
a Total work compensations, deflated by average CPI.
On the eve of political transition, public sector earnings rose substantially
(12–28 per cent real growth), while the rest of the economy faced a more
modest increase (9 per cent). Relative positions of public sectors remained
surprisingly stable after 1989: the 1989–1996 decrease in the higher
education was 27 percent, and the other three public sectors all experienced
a 24 per cent loss. In contrary with trends within public sector, salaries
show different path after 1989 if we look at public-private differences. The
following table contains direct comparisons:7
Table 5. Public-private earnings comparisons
(private sector=100)
1986 1989 1992 1994 1995 1996
Public administration 101 114 113 109 113 96
Public education 94 96 94 92 88 81
Higher education 104 121 107 109 107 99
Health services 92 95 90 89 83 80
Transition itself produced serious devaluation of public wages, compared
to private ones. The trend was continuous for the whole period (with the
exception of temporary gains in public administration in 1995), and in
public education and health services it was smooth as well. Employees in
public administration and higher education were more successful in
keeping their position until 1995, but in 1996 their 1989 relative positions
were reestablished.
The overall figures, however, hide very different employment structures.
Public administration, education and health services are all human capital
intensive sectors, relative to the competitive branches of the economy. In
addition, transition resulted a robust growth in returns to human capital in
the whole economy: the ratio of average earnings in the upper (at least
college) and median education level  (vocational school) raised from 146
percent in 1986 to 220 percent in 1996. Measuring human capital is not
without serious problems, and using education level is only the simplest but
not obviously the best solution. Human capital acquired at the workplace
(learning-by doing or on-the-job training), different human capital
depreciation paths in education categories, or different returns in different
occupations cannot be captured by education level. For our purposes, this
very simple solution can also be satisfying as it can reveal the basic
differences in trends for the whole economy and for the public sector.
1 The
following table contains the above public-private comparisons, but instead
of providing whole sector averages, the comparisons are given for
comparable educational level groups. In addition, figures 1-4 reveal the
qualitative characteristics of the trends.
                                                
1 One-way analysis of variances within the sectors show that in the private sector 25–30,
and in the public sectors 30–75 per cent of total sum of squares of earnings can be
attributed to variation between simple three-class schooling level categories.8












Public administration 73 88 90 76 84 63
Public education 70 84 75 65 63 42
Higher education 80 87 77 71 61 53
Health services 80 80 98 78 70 55
Figures 1-4:  Time series of public/private earnings ratios,






























































Figure 3: Higher education Figure 4: Health servides9
The processes that led to the observed changes in sector averages were the
results of trends in returns to human capital and of education level
composition changes. The serious depreciation of public sector-related
human capital, relative to the competitive sector (see Table 6 and Figures
1-4) should have resulted in larger decline of public sector average earnings
than the observed one. The trends that interfered with the effects of the
above mentionned processes have to be a subject of a more detailed
analysis.
The effect of changes in human capital composition and earnings can be
separated by a simple decomposition model (see  Annex). The change in
public-private average wage difference can be attributed to four distinct
components, each measuring ‘ceteris paribus’ effects of structural and
relative changes in earnings
2. First, the overall growth in returns to human
capital would have raised the average earnings in public sectors relative to
the rest of the economy since public employment is far more human capital
intensive. Second, only  overall changes in human capital stock  in the
economy (that is, changes in the composition of the employees resulted by
demographic trends and massive unemployment of less educated in the
competitive sector), would have moderate effect on inter-sector earnings
differences, because these trends have not changed significantly the human
capital stock of the economy in comparison to the inter-sector differences.
Third, public-private differences in returns to human capital would have,
ceteris paribus, widen far more the observed average earnings gap. And
fourth,  changes in human capital composition differences, alone, would
have raised the public administration-private sector difference, because of
the shift towards less educated categories in the administration, but
                                                
2 Traditionally, regression models are evaluated for ceteris paribus economic investiga-
tions. However, Kertesi and Köllõ [1995] estimated earnings functions with large
numbers of significant right-hand-side variables, and even their extensive
specifications failed at the reset test of omitted variables. In addition, their
specifications robustly faile at parameter-stability tests. For example, separating the
samples (or the sector-specific subsamples) into categories by gender gives Wald's
Chi
2 = 30911 for 1986 and 5591 for 1996. Structural problems indicate that a large
number of cross-product right-hand side variables should be added to the basic
specifications to deal with interaction effects. It is clear, that our simple method
suffers from even larger hidden composition ant interaction effects, but it does not
seem to be possible to get rid of these effects and avoid complications in
interpretation. As indicated in footnote 4 and by the following results as well, our
simple methode provides robust results for our purposes and gives a clear background
for incentive conclusions.10
somewhat lower the gap for the other three public sectors, because of
reverse trends.
Table 7. Results of the simple decomposition model: Ceteris paribus
human capital related changes in public-private real
earnings differences (measured in pctage of 1986
competitive earnings), between 1986 and 1996
Average effects, in the percentage of

























Public administration 24  0 -19 -11   -6
Public education 29 -6 -45    6 -16
Higher education 28 -1 -29   -2   -4
Health services 10 -2 -24   -1 -16
a Measured as the ratio of total real earnings difference change and 1986 compe-
titive average earnings.
Human capital produced the lowest returns in public education in 1986, and
it has suffered the largest depreciation as well. The 45 per cent loss
decreased the public education - private sector salary rates from 75 to 42
per cent among the most educated from 1986 to 1996, but this trend was
balanced in two thirds by the overall rise in returns to human capital. In
other words, while most educated employees in private branches earned 1.6
times more than the economy average in 1986 and 2.5 in 1996, primary and
secondary school teachers experienced a decline from 1.2 to 1.04. The
effects of human capital stock changes indicate that the composition in
public education has changed just like the average, so the observed 16 per
cent point widening of private sectors-public education earnings gap can be
attributed fully to relative devaluation of teachers’ human capital.
The same is true for health services. Physicians earned 56 per cent more
than the average in 1986, and this difference declined to 38 per cent in
1996, while lower educated medical employees earned 85 per cent of the
average in 1986 and 80 per cent in 1996. The gap widened significantly,
from 8 to 20 per cent between health services and competitive sectors, and
this mainly resulted from the devaluation of physicians’ activity.11
Processes in higher education are different. The least observed decrease of
relative average earnings among public sectors can be attributed to the fact
that college and university teachers’ salaries fell behind the most educated
employees in private sector, but did not fell behind the economy average:
they earned 1.2 times more than the average Hungarian employee in 1986,
while this ratio was 1.3 in 1996.
The story is almost the same for public administration where changes in
returns to education level would have somewhat decrease the average
public-private earnings gap. But, interestingly enough, significant shifts can
be observed in human capital composition of the sector: ratio of higher
educated employees fell from 31 to 26 per cent, with a similar decrease in
high school-level educated employment. This change led to the 6 per cent
widening of average earnings gap.
Teachers in higher education and educated employees in public
administration are closer substitutes for private sector employment than
public school teachers or physicians. In competitive environment, this fact
would result in narrower earnings gap for the former – and our findings are
partly consistent width this prediction. Public-private salary differences
were three times bigger for primary and secondary school teachers and for
physicians, in absolute value, compared to educated employees in public
administration or higher education. While higher educated public sector
employees suffered a huge loss in their earnings position, the same is not
true for less educated groups (or, for public and higher education, their loss
was less significant), see Table 6. This fact also supports our interpretation,
since sector-specific human capital can play a minor role in the case less
educated employees’ (e.g. administrative or maintenance occupations)
productivity. If we think that transition led to a closer relationship between
productivity and earnings in the private sector, the above mentioned trends
can be interpreted as the revelation of substitution relations among
occupations. The immediate consequence of this interpretation is that that
these processes resulting in public sector salaries are not completely
resistant to labor demand structural changes despite the lack of ownership
and output competition.
But how close substitutes are public and private employees? Earnings
comparisons in Table 6. show that less educated public sector employees
earned 65-85 per cent, and most educated earned 40-65 per cent less then
comparable group of employees in private sector, in 1996. These large12
groups contain many occupation types, so direct comparisons are usually
misleading. Of course, public school teachers and medical occupations
have modest chances to find employment out of their sectors. But higher
education and public administration occupations can also be also different
from this point of view. Next table shows some wage trends in comparable
occupation groups in public administration and private sector.
Table 8.  Relative salary position of certain occupations in public
administration and private sector, 1986-1996












a 191 208 243 379
Business administration
a 148 148 180 234
Higher educated bureaucrats
a 138 147 173 221
Lower educated bureaucrats
b 82 105 108 121
Administrative occupations
b 78 83 89 93
a With higher education level.
b With secondary school education level.
The above figures tell the same story as simple education-level
comparisons. In most human capital intensive occupations, public sector
earnings have increased a lot, but they could not keep up with private
trends. First lines in Table 8 suggest (but, of course, do not proove alone)
that the more important role human capital plays in productivity, the larger
relative public earnings depreciation can be observed.
Incentive effects of relative public sector salary losses
Incentive effects of observed trends can be estimated using several
assumptions. If we focus on monetary work compensations only,
depreciation of sector-specific returns to human capital should result in
decreasing human capital stocks in public institutions, within observable
education level groups. That is, if returns to knowledge are larger in private
sector, qualified people will choose private employers (in substitutable
occupations, e.g. some higher education teachers), or talented young people
will not choose schools providing devaluated knowledge (for less13
substitutable occupations, e.g. public school teachers). These processes will
obviously result (in the short run for the first, or in the long run for the
second group) in a less qualified (less qualified in terms of unobserved
human capital) public sector employment.
It is clear however, that not only present salary conditions matter but future
prospects also. But if we glance at figures 1 to 4, we face a more or less
continuous decline in relative public/private returns to human capital. If we
add that it is not a well grounded belief that a deep public sector
restructuring and this way a reversing of the above trends would take place,
anticipation of significant higher future public/private earnings ratio is not
a likely background for the above described decisions.
But if we turn to non-monetary (or non observable monetary) components
of workers’ compensation, other effects should also be considered. Let us
take the example of educated health employment. We have seen that
physicians experienced a significant devaluation of their salaries, while
their occupation is one of the most knowledge-based ones. In addition, out-
of-public sector employment possibilities are not open to these employees,
or at least, not in a large number. At the same time, no significant decrease
can be observed in the popularity of medical schools or in the students’
human capital stock (measured e.g. by entrance exam scores required by
schools).
3 These facts indicate that anticipated returns to physicians’ human
capital could not decrease much, so observed salary decline was balanced
by other benefits. While massive privatisation of health services is not very
likely at least for the following years, it is not impossible in the long run.
However, better founded beliefs can also play a major role in the decisions:
illegal and thus unobserved direct patient-doctor payments are very well
known attributes of Hungarian medical system. Moreover, the same kind of
arguments can be developed for other public services as well.
Compensating differences like the above can narrow the above observed
earnings public-private differences, and speculative arguments can reveal
important possibilities. In the following arguments we try to find out if
there are such differences and evaluate their possible consequences.
First, let us consider the in-kind or simply hidden employer-to-employee
benefits. We have no reason to suppose that public sector non-salary
benefits given by employers (e.g. official cars or welfare expenditures)
                                                
3The application/admission ratio has remained around 500 per cent, and the required
examination scores are still among the highest, around 108/120 pts. See Ministry of
Education [1997].14
exceed private ones, because these compensation techniques are the best
ways to avoid taxes and other public charges, so profit maximizing
employers will use these cheaper compensating possibilities until their
optimal ratio.
Three other factors can comensate for salary differences: working
conditions, work possibilities besides major job and illegal benefits. It is
clear, that a part of public institutions require less efforts and/or less time
(e.g. school holidays), but these attributes are not the products of the last
ten years, so they could compensate for the gap of the 1980s but not for its
widening. Civil servants’ and public servants’ special employment
conditions guaranteed by 1992 acts aimed at providing compensating
differences to balance the depreciation of relative earnings. But the
significant results of these regulations were either irrelevant (firing
obstacles) or discouraging (strict seniority rules) for the best qualified
employees, so they could not narrowed the gap.
Work revenues besides major job can be relevant compensation only for
several occupations. While a major part of higher education professors and
also some physicians are obviously involved in research programmes or in
business activities, these opportunities do not exist for primary and
secondary school teachers or for the most of the physicians. Employees in
public administration are serously constrained in their activities by law.
Excepted for higher education professors and some physicians, significant
rise in illegal benefits is then the only unmeasured factor that could provide
compensations for relative salary losses. These benefits has two
characteristics: they result from employee-client relation, not from the
employer, and are not covered by taxes. Whether these transfers lead to
direct efficiency losses by distorting competitive market outcomes (e.g. in
regulation, public investment or public purchasing decisions) or not (e.g. in
patient-physician payments), the above mentionned characteristics result in
at least central budget revenue losses and serious moral problems.
Obviously, we cannot estimate the effect of these compensations, and
without empirical evidence it is not possible to judge whether they can
balance the effects of salary depreciation. In public educaion, however,
illegal benefits cannot play as important role as in health services, and a
significant part of employess in public administration do not have an access
to these benefits.15
Conclusions
While competitive employment decreased by more than 30 per cent during
the transition, number of public employees have not change a lot, so a very
large (24 per cent) public employment ratio was reached in 1995. These
trends c led to decreases in public sector salaries, so after temporary gains
at the last years of socialist system, public sector employees’ has
experienced serious losses in their relative positions. While most educated
public employees’ earnings has increased, public-private salary gap has
widened from 2-25 per cent to 37-58 per cent (occupations that were closer
substitutes for private sector, has suffered from less serious relative losses).
For some occupation groups, unmeasured but not illegal differences can
compensate for earnings losses, but the ratio of these employees is not
significant. The widening of private-public salary gap could have than two
major effects: increasing ratio of less qualified employees in public
institutions and/or major role of illegal benefits in workers’ compensation.
As none of these results are favorable from social perspective, public sector
reform should consider significant changes in public employment
incentives. Of course, employment reduction and regulation changes are
necessary conditions of increases in salary incentives.
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Annex
Public-private salary difference change decomposition model
Average earnings are equal the weighted averages of education level
earnings in all sectors:
W f W p pi pi
i
96 96 96 =￿  and W f W c ci ci
i
96 96 96 =￿ ,
where
W denotes the average real earnings in the sector,
p and c denote the sector indices (p=“public”, c=“competitive”)
i denotes the index of the schooling level category,
fi denotes the i-th category weight in the sector,
and the upper indices (96 and 86) denote the year of observation.
The data are summarized in the following table.
Real earnings (in 1990 forints)
Sector 0-11 classes Secondary ed. Higher ed. Total
1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996
Public
administration
6 903 7 270 9 473 11 774 14 544 19 098 10 264 12 031
Public education 6 662 6 168 9 079 8 874 12 051 12 641 9 610 10 205
Higher education 7 607 6 729 9 343 8 555 12 338 16 092 10 594 12 371
Health 7 657 7 412 8 634 9 768 15 755 16 767 9 338 10 063
Competitive sector 9 514 9 528 10 778 14 005 16 089 30 389 10 187 12 556
Composition of employment (%)
Sector 0-11 classes Secondary ed. Higher ed. Total
1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996
Public
administration
29.4 37.7 40.1 35.6 30.5 26.7 100.0 100.0
Public education 28.9 27.1 29.7 18.1 41.4 54.8 100.0 100.0
Higher education 23.0 22.4 21.9 21.6 55.1 56.1 100.0 100.0
Health 50.5 44.1 32.7 36.8 16.8 19.1 100.0 100.0
Competitive sector 72.3 63.0 21.6 28.6 6.1 8.4 100.0 100.018
Let us use the following notation, for the two years (with upper indices 86
and 96):




96 96 96 96 96 96 96 = - = - ￿ ￿ .
The public-competitive wage difference,  D can be decomposed in two
ways:




96 96 96 96 96 96 96 = - + - ￿ ￿ .




96 96 96 96 96 96.
With these notations, decomposition of change between 1986 and 1996
earnings differences in the public and “private” (competitive) sector, DD
can be captured by the following equation:
       ( ) ( ) DD D D W W W W p c p c = - = - - -
96 86 96 96 86 86








D D D D , where
D f f fi pi ci = -  ,
D W W Wi pi ci = -  , and
D denotes the change between 1986 and 1996.
In the decomposition model, one can choose between 2
3=8 different
weight-combinations. (2 year-combinations for the first two terms, 2 for the
second two terms, and choosing the competitive for the first and the public
sector for the second two terms as weight, or vice versa.) Using one of the
combinations of weights, the above are the abbreviations of the following
terms:






= + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
96 86 96 86
The first term of the decomposition captures the effect of the  change in
structural differences of the sectors, the second term captures the effect of
overall relative wage changes of the categories, that is, the changes in
returns to human capital, through the different composition of the sectors.
The third term represents the the effect of  relative in-category relative19
wage changes of the two sectors, that is the change in differences of returns
to human capital for the two sectors. Last, the fourth term captures the
effect of  overall structural changes in the economy. In some cases, the
results are very sensitive to the choice of weights. For instance, very
different magnitudes can be assigned to the “overall” wage shift between
categories if one considers the competitive sector (index  c) or the public
sector (index p). While the absolute effects suffer from these problems, the
sign and relative magnitude of the effects are much less sensitive to the
choice of weight-combination. The following tables show the effect
averages and standard deviations.
Average effects, in the percentage of  relative






D W fi i
i ￿ D f Wi i
i
D ￿ f D i Wi
i







24.2 0.4 -19.5 -11.4 -6.3
Public education 28.9 -5.6 -45.2 5.5 -16.5
Higher education 28.1 -0.9 -28.9 -1.9 -3.7
Health 10.3 -1.8 -24.0 -0.7 -16.1
a Measured as the ratio of total real earnings difference changes and
1986 competitive average wage (dD/Wc
86).
Standard deviation of effects, in the percentage
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14.1 2.4 13.2 5.4 6.3
Public education 26.8 6.7 27.1 5.3 16.5
Higher education 15.2 1.2 15.2 1.2 3.7
Health 8.3 2.1 8.5 0.4 16.1
a Measured as the ratio of total real earnings difference changes and
1986 competitive average wage (dD/Wc
86).